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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
FERNANDO GONZALEZ-CAMARGO,: Case No. 20110027-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
The State agrees that the conviction for receiving stolen property should be 
reversed because the trial court committed reversible error in admitting hearsay evidence. 
State's brief (S.B.):15-17. As Appellant Fernando Gonzalez-Camargo pointed out in his 
opening brief (A.B.):31-43, the trial court committed error in admitting hearsay evidence 
that the laptop was stolen, and the error was prejudicial. Gonzalez-Camargo respectfully 
requests that his conviction for receiving stolen property be reversed. 
The only remaining consideration for this Court is whether the State proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine in a metal box located in the northwest bedroom. The State fails to 
analyze the evidence presented in this case in light of controlling constructive possession 
case law, and disregards the factors Utah appellate courts have relied on in assessing 
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that a defendant constructively possessed 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contraband. Because the State failed to introduce evidence proving a sufficient nexus 
between Gonzalez-Camargo and the drugs in the northwest bedroom, the conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance should also be reversed and the charge dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THAT GONZALEZ-CAMARGO CONSTRUCTIVELY 
POSSESSED METHAMPHETAMINE FOUND IN A METAL BOX IN A 
ROOM APPELLANT DID NOT SOLELY OCCUPY. 
As outlined in A.B.: 15-30, the State must do more than establish "mere occupancy 
of a portion of the premises where the drug is found," in order to prove constructive 
possession. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). In addition to showing 
ownership or occupancy, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a 
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband showing "that the accused had 
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State v. 
Layman, 1999 UT 79, \\6, 985 P.2d 911 (citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 
1985)). The State has failed to establish a sufficient nexus or the power and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the methamphetamine found in a metal box located in 
a bedroom which was not solely occupied by Gonzalez-Camargo. 
Rather than analyzing how the facts in this case compare with those in Fox, 
Layman, State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and other Utah cases, the 
State dispenses with those opinions and the considerations for determining constructive 
possession outlined in those cases. S.B.:12-13. Instead, the State makes only a superficial 
argument for constructive possession, trying to show proof of the requisite nexus, and 
?. 
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power and intent to exercise dominion and control by arguing that Gonzalez-Camargo 
lived in the northwest bedroom with his girlfriend, he "was in the apartment when 
officers entered to conduct the search," his possessions dominated the bedroom, and the 
box was initially found on the floor near computers that belonged to him. S.B.: 13-14. 
Even if all of this were proven below, it would not be enough to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine. But a review of the evidence shows; that even this meager argument 
offered by the State is not supported by the evidence, and the evidence as a whole "is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the 
methamphetamine. State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14, 210 P.3d 288 (citation omitted). 
First, the evidence relied on by the State is not sufficient to establish constructive 
possession, even if it were proven below. Even if it were true that Gonzalez-Camargo's 
belongings dominated the room, there were also women's belongings and under the 
evidence cited by the State, it is just as likely that the box belonged to the woman 
occupant as it was that it belonged to Gonzalez-Camargo. The fact that Gonzalez-
Camargo was in the apartment when officers arrived outside also did not prove that the 
box was his; his girlfriend was also in the apartment, as were twelve or so additional 
people, all of whom were allowed to move through the apartment and exit on their own 
without police observation, and any of whom could have placed the box in the bedroom 
as they exited. In fact, it was evident that people inside the apartment were trying to hide 
evidence since officers found a social security card in the toilet. Ex. 6. If occupancy alone 
3 
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is not enough to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt, then even if 
the State established that Gonzalez-Camargo was an occupant of the bedroom, the 
location of drugs in the bedroom near some of the belongings arguably attributed to him 
was not sufficient to establish possession. In fact, it was just as likely that the girlfriend or 
someone else possessed the methamphetamine. 
This is not a case where the drugs were found in a drawer or on a shelf with some 
of Gonzalez-Camargo's possessions or where Gonzalez-Camargo had the key to the box, 
or there were receipts, paraphernalia, or other indicia that the drugs were his. See, e.g., 
State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, TfiJ3, 34, 122 P.3d 639; Hansen, 732 P.2d at 132. Instead, 
the State arguably does not have sufficient evidence to establish Gonzalez-Camargo 
occupied the room, let alone additional evidence proving that he had "the power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over the [methamphetamine]." Fox, 709 P.2d at 
319; Layman, 1999 UT 79, [^16; see A.B.:23-30. 
Additionally, the State stretches the evidence beyond what was introduced below 
and makes unreasonable inferences to support its argument. While the State is correct that 
Gonzalez-Camargo was in the apartment when officers arrived outside, he along with 
twelve or thirteen other people exited well before any officer entered. The officers did not 
see Gonzalez-Camargo in the room that contained the drugs and anyone could have 
shoved the box in the room as they were leaving the apartment, or officers or the canine 
unit could have moved the box, as is evident from the fact that the metal box was in 
different locations. In any event, the fact that Gonzalez-Camargo was in the apartment 
when officers arrived outside, and was later returned to the apartment under officer 
4 
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control, does nothing to prove that he possessed the metal box with methamphetamine 
inside. 
Nor was the northwest bedroom "dominated by [Gonzalez-Camargo's] 
possessions and effects, [and] not his girlfriend's" as claimed by the State. S.B.:13. The 
State bases this claim on an incorrect and very dated stereotype—that the room was filled 
with computers, electronic equipment, tools, "and other items typically associated with 
men," thereby drawing the unreasonable inference that Gonzalez-Camargo's possessions 
dominated the room. S.B.:13. Gonzalez-Camargo acknowledged that the stack of 
computers an officer was carrying was his and that he repaired computers, but that does 
not mean that computers that were set up or beiijg used in the room all belonged to him or 
that other electronic equipment and tools were his. In any event, the girlfriend's purse 
with identification was in the bedroom - not with her. There was also a pink pack, 
makeup, women's jewelry, women's clothing, and pint: containers in the room. Ex. 6. 
The State disregards the evidence shown in the DVD and testified to by the officers and 
makes improper inferences when it argues that male belongings dominated the room. 
And, even if Gonzalez-Camargo's belongings dominated the room, the State would still 
be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the box of methamphetamine was 
his, which it has not. 
Further, while the State claims that the box was on the floor with two computers, 
there is no evidence the computers and box were intermingled the way the items were 
intermingled with the drugs in Workman, 2005 UT 66, <[Hf3, 34. There, the equipment 
being used to produce methamphetamine was intermingled on a shelf with items clearly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
belonging to Workman whereas here, the metal box was reported to have been on the 
floor near the mattress at some point, with no mention of the computers or any other 
items. R345:191. The floor is a shared space that it much larger than a shelf or drawer; a 
couple of computers that may or may not have belonged to Gonzalez-Camargo nearby in 
this common area fails to make the State's case even if it could establish that the metal 
box was initially found in that location. 
Additionally, even if the State had shown that the methamphetamine was 
intermingled with computers, which it has not, the Court was clear in Workman that the 
conclusion there that the State had proven a sufficient nexus was based on a number of 
factors, including the location of the clandestine lab in a bedroom Workman shared, 
Workman's statements suggesting guilt, her admission that she had bought some of the 
glassware used in the clandestine lab, her fingerprint on a container, and her own drug 
use, along with the fact that "[h]er personal items were intermingled with the equipment 
being used to produce meth." Id. And, the Court indicated that the intermingling alone 
would not have proven constructive possession, stating, "[t]aken alone, it is not likely that 
any one, or even a small group, of these factors would be enough to establish a sufficient 
nexus between Workman and the clandestine lab." Id. Hence, even if the metal box were 
found on the floor along with a couple of computers, the State did not establish the 
requisite nexus between Gonzalez-Camargo and the drugs. 
The State's depiction of the evidence is further flawed. It claims Agent Metcalf 
was the first to enter the apartment and "testified that the lock box containing the 
methamphetamine was found on the floor next to the mattress." S.B.:14. Actually, Agent 
6 
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Metcalf testified that he was "not certain [he] was the first one in the door or not" and 
that he thought Agent Spann entered the apartment before him. R345:171. Agent Spann 
filmed the room with the box on the bed. Ex.6. In any event, regardless of who entered 
the apartment first, there is no evidence as to which of the agents entered the bedroom 
first, and it is simply unknown whether the box was initially located on the floor or on the 
bed or elsewhere or whether the canine unit or SWAT team moved it. As set forth in the 
opening brief, the SWAT team was in the house for over an hour before the agents 
entered and at least one if not two canine units went through the house, presumably 
searching for drugs. A.B.:23-24. The cushions on the sofa were "tossed" suggesting that 
some sort of search had taken place prior to the filming of the DVD. Ex. 6. Regardless of 
whether an officer believed that SWAT teams ordinarily do not conduct a full search, no 
member of the SWAT team testified that they did not conduct a search in this case. 
Further, the fact that many SWAT team members and sit least one canine unit went 
through the house for over an hour before the agents entered and the pillows on the sofas 
were "tossed" shows that items inside the apartment were disturbed before the agents 
entered. Because no one testified that s/he was the person who initially found the metal 
box and no one testified regarding its initial location, the State did not establish exactly 
where it was found. Under these circumstances, the State's reliance on the location where 
the metal box was found as the primary fact supporting constructive possession 
underscores the weakness of the State's case. 
As set forth in A.B.: 15-30, the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Gonzalez-Camargo constructively possessed the methamphetamine found in the metal 
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box. The evidence presented by the State was inconclusive, requiring that the conviction 
be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Fernando Gonzalez-Camargo respectfully requests that his 
conviction for receiving stolen property be overturned based on his arguments in the 
opening brief and the concession of the State. He further requests that his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance be reversed and the matter dismissed based on the 
State's failure to prove that he constructively possessed the controlled substance. 
SUBMITTED this _H_ day of February, 2012. 
JOAN C. WAIT 
ANDREA GARLAND 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
o
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